The Future of the EU and its Strategic Autonomy by CICIR Analyst Zhang Jian
sinification.substack.com
"The crisis in Ukraine ... will further weaken the EU's strength and international influence and accelerate its marginalisation in the global geopolitical landscape."
Thanks for this, very much paralleling Michael Hudson's thesis. An additional variable is the stagflation arising in the EU which will require yet higher interest rates which will intensify any economic contraction. Another is the severe damage that the European car industry will take from EVs from Tesla and China over the next few years (both in Europe and China). We may once again soon be hearing of the "sick man of Europe".
A fragmented EU means a fragmented bloc of liberal democracies and a weakened capacity to continue advancing democratic values, something Beijing has been actively and not discreetly trying to accomplish. If it's in the CCP's best interest or not, difficult to say, considering the chaotic nature of these systems.
Much of this reads like an analyst telling those above what they want to hear on some topics in the hope that they will listen to the rest.
For example, the bit about the depreciation of the Euro reducing export competitiveness is nonsense, clearly attuned to leaders who wish to supplant Germany in many fields. Most of Section I is in the same vein. The later comment about Germany as a good student seems to be pointed at a leadership which recently announced their intent to follow Germany's growth model through to developed world status (utterly impossible but that's not relevant here). The conclusion that this war will damage the EU's image abroad for reasons of hypocrisy surrounding human rights is likewise not really tenable.
That said, Zhang's actual conclusion, that the events of the Russo-Ukrainian War:
1. Make the EU more closely aligned with the US (reliant on, in Chinese parlance, because the CCP cannot conceive of a genuine alliance based on shared values and interests)
2. Measurably increase the chances of internal dissention in the decade or so after the war concludes
3. Make it highly unlikely for the EU to triangulate between the US and China...
are pretty much smack-on, I think. Zhang has just had to butter his real conclusions up with a bunch of nonsense that the leadership hopes is also true.
Thanks for this, very much paralleling Michael Hudson's thesis. An additional variable is the stagflation arising in the EU which will require yet higher interest rates which will intensify any economic contraction. Another is the severe damage that the European car industry will take from EVs from Tesla and China over the next few years (both in Europe and China). We may once again soon be hearing of the "sick man of Europe".
A fragmented EU means a fragmented bloc of liberal democracies and a weakened capacity to continue advancing democratic values, something Beijing has been actively and not discreetly trying to accomplish. If it's in the CCP's best interest or not, difficult to say, considering the chaotic nature of these systems.
Much of this reads like an analyst telling those above what they want to hear on some topics in the hope that they will listen to the rest.
For example, the bit about the depreciation of the Euro reducing export competitiveness is nonsense, clearly attuned to leaders who wish to supplant Germany in many fields. Most of Section I is in the same vein. The later comment about Germany as a good student seems to be pointed at a leadership which recently announced their intent to follow Germany's growth model through to developed world status (utterly impossible but that's not relevant here). The conclusion that this war will damage the EU's image abroad for reasons of hypocrisy surrounding human rights is likewise not really tenable.
That said, Zhang's actual conclusion, that the events of the Russo-Ukrainian War:
1. Make the EU more closely aligned with the US (reliant on, in Chinese parlance, because the CCP cannot conceive of a genuine alliance based on shared values and interests)
2. Measurably increase the chances of internal dissention in the decade or so after the war concludes
3. Make it highly unlikely for the EU to triangulate between the US and China...
are pretty much smack-on, I think. Zhang has just had to butter his real conclusions up with a bunch of nonsense that the leadership hopes is also true.
I think that China prefers a "stable" world order - which is favourable to commerce and trade and less susceptible to military confrontation.